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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper asked professionals in the legal system to evaluate the current state and effectiveness of laws 
to identify and deter computer crime. Responses were evaluated with a formal structural equation model. 
The results generally show that legal professionals believe potential jurors have minimal knowledge of 
computer crime issues. More importantly, they also believe that judges have little knowledge or 
experience. A similar lack of knowledge by defense attorneys indicates that it could be difficult for a 
person accused of computer related infractions to find adequate representation. On the other hand, more 
experienced participants do not believe computer laws present an effective deterrent to computer crime. 
The bottom line is that all levels of the legal profession will need more education and training in aspects 
of computer security laws. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Computer security topics within the literature have traditionally focused on technical issues, see Bidgoli (2003) and 
Opara and Marchewka (2006).  These issues are important and relatively complex. However, computer usage and 
security exist within a society, where the framework is defined by laws and the judicial system. Ultimately, 
computer security requires both technical and legal solutions. The oft-criticized Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA) presents a classic case. Prior to its enactment, copyright law made it illegal to steal satellite shows and 
other content. Broadcasters used encryption and other technical methods to protect the content from casual theft. 
However, it was legal for people to sell technology that could decrypt the signals. Possession and sale of this 
technology could not be stopped, and it was difficult and expensive to detect and enforce copyright laws on a 
person-by-person basis. Implementation of the DMCA makes it easier to curtail the distribution of the tools used to 
steal the satellite signals. Whether DMCA goes too far or has undesirable consequences is not the point here. The 
case highlights the importance of the judicial system in providing a remedy with respect to technology issues. 
 
The judicial system encompasses three main aspects: (1) Creation of laws, (2) Investigation of potential crimes, and 
(3) a trial phase which involves prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and sometimes jurors. A broader definition 
would also include punishment issues, involving prison sentences and fines, but these issues remain constant 
regardless of the type of law or crime, and these concerns have been covered extensively in other literature. Civil 
complaints and trials can also become important tools in dealing with computer security topics, but many of the 
circumstances will be similar to criminal cases, although the various roles will be handled by different organizations. 
A primary question posed here is whether the current U.S. judicial system needs to be improved to be able to handle 
computer security cases. In particular, the federal government has passed several new laws in the past few years that 
relate to computer and technology issues. However, are the supporting parts of the judicial system able to handle 
these new laws? What changes or support might need to be added? To begin to address these questions, a survey of 
legal professionals was undertaken to evaluate current conditions and highlight aspects of the judicial process that 
need to be improved. The simple answer to the main question is that most participants do not feel the system is 
prepared to handle complex technical cases. The most pressing need is for education and training of the various 
levels of judicial participants. The degree of shortfall and the details are explored in this paper. 
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RELEVANT LITERATURE 
 
The literature on computer security and crime is increasingly diverse, and there is not sufficient space to summarize 
all of it here. As E-commerce applications continues to expand the online business model, firms are attempting to 
determine fair information usage practices and the legal dynamics as part of an overall policy, as explained by 
Ryker, Khurrum and Bhutta (2006).  Prior research has attempted to characterize the diverse nature of computer 
crime and judicial involvement.  
 
Dowland et al (1999) found that the public in the UK was aware that computer crime and security are concerns in 
the general case but they lack knowledge as to how the two most prominent laws available at that time were 
effective in deterring computer crime. In fact many respondents were unfamiliar with the concept of computer crime 
and effective legislation. 
 
Carr and Willams (2000) compare the implementation of computer crime laws in the UK, Malaysia and Singapore 
to gauge the effectiveness as deterrents. The conclusion is that these laws have not led to any large amount of 
prosecutions due to a series of factors. The factors localize themselves into a lack of firm level participation in the 
investigation and reporting process, an absence of sufficient training by members of the legal establishment and that 
the basis of the legislation centers upon economic positioning (punishment) as opposed to security deterrence.    
  
In a response to the increase in computer related security and crime occurrences, the Hong Kong government has 
passed a series of legislative acts to address this problem. Kennedy (2001) reports on the actions of the Inter-
departmental Working Group on Computer Related Crime in strengthening existing legislation to more effectively 
to deter computer security outbreaks in Hong Kong.  
   
Caelli (2002) argues that the original design of the personal computer fostered a culture of non security, in that 
systems were designed with minimal security controls. As the use of the PC and distributed systems increased, the 
need for governmental intervention as a catalyst for protection was necessitated. Government involvement in the 
contemporary information environment should be twofold. The first level supports the idea that government must 
structure acceptable legislative actions to address the validity of electronic transactions and enforce a floor level of 
minimum security standards. Caelli’s second view of legislation is for the government to define a set of 
“professional qualifications as well as a process to support accreditation of information security professionals.” In 
other words determine educational and regulatory standards for security practitioners. 
   
Walden (2004) presents the case that countries need to structure laws to combat computer security crimes given the 
complex nature of the infractions and the cross jurisdictional entanglements these cases contain. With many 
computer crimes occurring in country A while the perpetrators may be in country B, the rules of evidence, legal 
procedures and investigative prerogatives all vary. This causes the system of legislation to be less than effective as a 
deterrent. Walden suggests a set of legislation modeled upon the UK’s Computer Misuse Act of 1990. 
 
Gerard, Hillison and Pacini (2004) discuss how the US government has made a pronounced effort to gain the upper 
hand on identity theft issues. Various laws have been enacted to help alleviate the problem. A similar approach 
would be required to handle the issue of computer security with one important caveat—business organizations must 
ramp up their awareness and internal controls with respect to security. The business controls will augment the role of 
the legal system in addressing computer security concerns.  
 
As the broad and pervasive nature of computer crime and security threats continues to increase, the judicial system 
must respond through the effective design and implementation of legislation. The following section provides a brief 
discussion concerning computer laws. 
 
COMPUTER LAWS 
  
Increasingly, society is turning to the legal system to support computer security goals. The approach in the legal 
system has been fractured—particularly after Easterbrook’s speech (1996). Easterbrook argued that just as there was 
no need for a “Law of the Horse,” there is little need for “cyberlaw.” The underlying principles of law should be 
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applied to situations regardless of whether the computer is involved. Other writers, such as Lessig (1999) have 
argued that cyberspace contains unique features that require new laws. The various arguments are interesting but the 
details are beyond the scope of this paper. In any case, cyberspace at a minimum requires new definitions to clarify 
objects and actions. For example, is a cached copy of an electronic item a violation of copyright laws? 
Consequently, as noted by several authors such as Lampson (2002) and Landwehr (2001), Congress has passed 
several laws to prohibit various actions with respect to computers. 
 
Table 1 lists the primary sections of the U.S. Code that are used in the federal prosecution of computer crimes. This 
list is provided by the Department of Justice. The most important set of computer laws is embodied in 18 USC 1030, 
which was largely created by the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984 and modified several times. This section 
defines and outlaws most attacks on computers. Crimes charged under these sections represent the purest form of 
computer fraud.    
 
Table 1:  Computer Crime Regulations in the United States Code. 
 
US Code  Law 
18 USC 1028 Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998 
18 USC 1029 Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Access Devices 
18 USC 1030 *** Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984 (and others) 
18 USC 1362 Communication Lines, Stations, or Systems 
18 USC 2510 Wire and Electronic Communications Interception 
18 USC 2701 Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Access 
18 USC 3121 Recording of Dialing, Routing, Address, and Signaling Information 
18 USC 1341 Frauds and swindles 
18 USC 1343 Fraud by wire, radio, or television 
18 USC 2512 Manufacture, distribution, possession, advertising of interception devices 
prohibited 
 Cyber stalking 
18 USC 875 Interstate communications 
18 USC 2261A Interstate stalking 
47 USC 223 Obscene or harassing phone calls 
 Copyright 
17 USC 506 Criminal Offenses/Copyright 
18 USC 2319 Criminal Infringement of a Copyright 
18 USC 2318 Trafficking in counterfeit labels 
17 USC 1201 Circumvention of copyright protection schemes 
17 USC 1202 Integrity of copyright management information 
 Primary source is U.S.Department of Justice: http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/fedcode.htm
 
 
 
Several other sections of the Code are sometimes applied in technology-related crimes. For instance, 18 USC 1028 
makes identity theft illegal, but it also applies to the manufacture, use, and sale of physical identities; such as forging 
driver’s licenses. Similarly, crimes related to “access devices’ (largely telephones), are defined in 18 USC 1029. 
Again, this section is also used to prosecute crimes that never involved the computer, such as fraud committed using 
phone calls. Likewise, several other sections concern issues involving communication systems, such as 18 USC 
3121 and 18 USC 2512 that address the recording and interception of phone calls and other communications. As 
shown in the table, three sections of the code address cyber stalking and harassment involving computers or 
interstate phone calls. Finally, 17 USC 506 and related sections encompass criminal activities involving copyrights. 
In particular, the DMCA makes it a crime to circumvent copy protection devices.  
 
Table 2 shows some of the major laws that were passed to create and modify the various codes. This table also 
includes some of the privacy laws, which are not listed in Table 1. The main purpose of Table 2 is to draw attention 
to increasing activity in recent years with respect to technology and computer related legislation. Additionally, if 
you even casually follow the Congressional discussions, it is clear that computer crime and associated privacy 
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concerns are important ongoing topics. Many bills are introduced each year regarding various computer aspects 
(such as access, use, theft, fraud) even though few have become laws.  
 
Table 2:   Primary Federal Computer and Privacy Acts. 
 
Year US Code Act 
1970 15 §1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act 
1974 20 §1232g Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 
1974 5 §552a Privacy Act 
1984 18 §1029-2030 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
1986 18 §2510 Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
1987 15 §271-278 
40 §759 
Computer Security Act (federal computers) 
1988 18 §2701 Video Privacy Act (Bork Bill) 
1994 18 §2721 Driver’s Privacy Protection Act 
1994 47 §1001 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act 
1996 42 §201 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
1998 15 §6501 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
1998 17 §1201 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (non-circumvention) 
1998 18 §1028 Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act 
1999 15 §6801-6810 
15 §6821-6827 
Graham-Leach-Bliley Act (privacy and fraudulent access to financial 
information) 
2001 18 §1 USA Patriot Act 
2002 18 §1030 Cyber Security Enhancements Act (Homeland Security) 
2003 15 §1681 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act 
2003 18 §1037 CAN-SPAM Act 
 For a list of state laws, see http://nsi.org/Library/Compsec/computerlaw/statelaws.html
 
 
MODEL 
 
The primary hypothesis to be tested is whether the U.S. judicial system is capable of effectively handling computer 
crime cases. This hypothesis is best addressed by participants in the legal system (particularly attorneys and judges). 
In building a model to address this question, several additional details can be examined, such as relative opinions of 
the various branches of the legal system. The model framework applied to this study is consistent with Structural 
Equation Modeling (SEM) applications (see  Muthen, 2002; Muthen and Muthen, 2004; Post and Kagan, 2005).  
 
With a limited number of cases of computer crime arising each year, it is difficult for attorneys to specialize in the 
subject. In fact, it is likely that only a few attorneys and judges have acquired experience with cases of this nature. 
And in 11 years, only 23 federal computer crime cases have gone to trial, and two of those were non-jury trials. 
Consequently, there is minimal national experience with trying these cases. Certainly, defense and prosecuting 
attorneys have the skills and the ability to understand and apply laws to varying situations. But, it still takes time to 
learn the intricacies of the laws, develop and test strategies, and find ways to explain complicated technology-related 
concepts to juries.  
 
The U.S. legal system, like others, is built on several components (e.g., prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, 
juries, investigators). To address and handle complex technical cases involving computer crime means that all of the 
judicial components need an acceptable level of knowledge. Ultimately, the question involves the distribution of 
knowledge. If one component is more advanced, or substantially weaker than the others, the outcomes are unlikely 
to be “fair” or even effective. To obey laws, people have to understand at least the basic elements and to have faith 
that they are rationally adjudicated and enforced. A systematic model is applied to this study to determine a series of 
questions pertaining to the components of the judicial system and the relative degree of knowledge associated with 
computer security concerns.    
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Model Background 
 
Figure 1 shows the basic model. This model assumes that the laws are accurately written and that the punishment 
systems are effective. That is, those elements lie outside the scope of this particular research, which focuses on the 
detection and prosecution of cases. With this focus, the five main components of the process are: (1) investigators, 
(2) prosecutors, (3) defense attorneys, (4) judges, and (5) juries or potential jurors. The level of knowledge and 
experience of each component should ultimately affect the deterrence effect of the various laws applied to particular 
infractions. For example, weak investigations could result in fewer crimes being detected, or losing cases because of 
problems such as breaking the chain of evidence. Similarly, if attorneys (prosecution or defense) are unable to 
explain a case to jurors (because of lack of knowledge by attorneys or by jurors), the deterrence effect is altered.  
 
 
Investigators
Prosecutors
Defense
Judges
Jurors
Knowledge and Experience 
in Computers and Security
Deterrence
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Figure 1:  General Model. 
 
(The legal system can be an effective deterrent only if each primary component has sufficient knowledge and 
experience in computer security. But, some elements might be more important than others.) 
 
This model can be used to investigate several questions. The primary hypothesis is whether the judicial system can 
effectively and fairly prosecute and deter computer crime. More specifically, we would like to know if there are 
serious shortfalls in any of the individual components (judges, defense, prosecution, investigation, and jurors). These 
individual hypotheses can be tested by observing the values of the individual items projected in the model (see 
Figure 1). A second hypothesis is to identify whether some of the components are more important than the others in 
providing a deterrent. If so, it would make sense to strengthen those components first. These effects can be measured 
by estimating the strength of the relationship between knowledge variables and the deterrence variable. The model 
can also be used to identify whether some types of laws might be more amenable to deterrence than others. These 
effects can be evaluated by examining the constituent elements of the deterrence factor variable. In other words, 
what is the impact on overall deterrence of computer crimes from the elements of the judicial system based on the 
knowledge acquisition of the components?  
 
A third set of hypotheses involves the type of computer crime. It is conceivable that some types of crime will be 
easier to identify, prosecute, or defend than others. For example, it is technically difficult to identify participants of 
SPAM, and it is likely to be difficult to quantify and explain damages to jurors. Of course, the null hypothesis is that 
each of the types of crime have the same challenges.  
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Each of the elements in Figure 1 represents a latent variable—because none of the items are directly observable. 
Consequently, each item is somewhat subjective. Since there is no way to observe the actual values, a survey 
instrument was created to ask legal professionals to evaluate the current status of these measures. 
 
Survey Instrument 
 
Legal participants—largely in the form of attorneys—were surveyed to determine their self-rated knowledge of 
computer security legal issues, and their perceptions on the state of the discipline within the legal system. As 
indicated by the limited number of cases nationwide, finding legal scholars was challenging, and getting responses 
took considerable effort. In the end, 89 usable responses were culled from a base set of about 150 replies. The 
contact lists, largely derived from the Martindale-Hubbell directory focused on attorneys, so no responses were 
obtained from police or investigators. Most of respondents listed themselves as civil attorneys (46), several (30) 
listed themselves in the “other” category—which was largely educational, a limited number (5) of responses were 
obtained from current criminal attorneys, and prosecutors (5), along with a few sitting judges (3). The relatively low 
number of respondents in these last categories makes it difficult to reach statistical conclusions based on the 
respondent’s role within the system. However, all respondents evaluated all five categories, so the overall results are 
statistically acceptable. To control for differences in individual respondents, the survey also asked for basic 
background data such as the size of the organization that the participant was employed by.    
 
The principle portion of the instrument was a section (see Appendix for complete instrument) where respondents 
were asked to rate the main variables of interest on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 represented the least level of 
knowledge, skill, or experience. Respondents were asked to rate the five types of roles (investigators, prosecutors, 
defense attorneys, judges, and potential jurors). As an additional control, they were also asked to evaluate 
themselves and the organization they work for. Each role was evaluated in terms of four elements: (1) computer 
knowledge, (2) computer security knowledge, (3) knowledge of computer security laws, and (4) experience with 
computer security cases. 
 
In terms of deterrence, participants were asked to evaluate the effectiveness on eight specific types of computer 
crime: (1) external crackers, (2) insiders or employees, (3) computer viruses, (4) identity theft, (5) unsolicited 
commercial e-mail or spam, (6) spyware, (7) intellectual property theft or piracy, and (8) privacy issues such as 
those embodied in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). 
 
A Web site was employed for survey access which also facilitated simplification of data entry and navigation. 
Participants were primarily identified and contacted through publicly available local and regional lists. 
Specializations were not used in the initial search. That is, the survey was designed to get input from a variety of 
attorneys. In the end, few of them identified specialties. Bear in mind that that number of specialist practitioners in 
computer crime is small. A focus on this group would have biased the results. On the other hand, the respondents 
had some level of interest in the subject or they would not have completed the survey.   
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Due to the deliberate effort put in to finding willing participants, the completed results are statistically sound and 
reliable. The estimated model matches the theoretical model fairly closely and provides some useful results. 
 
Participants and Reliability 
 
Table 3 summarizes the basic background data on survey participants. Not surprisingly, most of the participants 
were from a larger city—which matches the population distribution of attorneys. The bulk of the practitioners were 
civil attorneys. In total, the responses from the criminal attorneys, prosecutors, and judges provide a reasonable 
representation, but probably not enough to analyze the results by role. 
 
 
 
 
Improving Judicial System to Handle CC       Journal of International Technology and Information Management 
 
7 
Table 3:   Participant Backgrounds. 
 
Item Category Observations 
Job Role Criminal 
Prosecutor 
Civil 
Judge 
Other/Educator 
5 
5 
46 
3 
30 
Company Size 1-100 
101-500 
501-1000 
1001-2000 
More than 2000 
15 
19 
10 
10 
28 
City Size Small, rural 
Mid-size city 
Suburb 
Metropolitan 
1 
6 
7 
74 
Job Experience Less than 1 year 
1-3 years 
4-5 years 
6-10 years 
More than 10 years 
2 
15 
7 
14 
50 
Most were from a large city, from a variety of company sizes. (The educators affected the size values.) 
 
Internal instrument reliability was measured by Cronbach’s alpha (1951). Because of its structure, this instrument is 
best evaluated in terms of the individual subsections based on separate ratings for computer knowledge (0.69), 
security issues (0.84), computer laws (0.85), experience with computer security cases (0.84), and the deterrence 
questions (0.93). Nunnally (1967) reports that Cronbach alpha scores of 0.8 or higher are indicators of internal 
construct validity with survey based data. Only the computer knowledge question falls below this threshold. This 
value can be explained by observing that considerable divergence exists in the definition of computer knowledge 
and skills. The value simply indicates (correctly) that there is disagreement over the meaning of the term and the 
inherent variability of self-evaluation of those skills. Since the study is not looking for computer programmers or 
experts, the subjectivity of the definition is acceptable—particularly with the strength of the coefficients in the other 
sections.  In terms of external reliability, the study was pre-tested with a few legal personnel to ensure the 
participants understood the questions. 
 
With any survey, there is a possibility of non-response bias. The standard method for evaluating this issue was 
provided by Farber (1948), Mayer (1970), and Armstrong and Overton (1977). The approach is to examine the 
characteristics of the respondents at various points in time. If the respondent characteristics are similar in the groups, 
then there is no substantial demographic bias. In this particular survey, two basic groups were created—with a split 
over the year-end holiday. Three characteristics (role, firm size, and experience) were compared via standard t-tests 
across these two groups. There was no significant difference (at a 5-percent level) in any of these characteristics. 
However, in examining these returns, we noted that both groups were overly represented by respondents with 
relatively long levels of experience. Consequently, a third (stratified random) initiative was used to garner additional 
responses that targeted a less-experienced group so that the overall panel would more closely represent the 
population demographics.  
 
Model Estimation 
 
Primary latent variables estimating the knowledge and experience of the various roles were identified through the 
four primary items asked for each role. These same items were also posed for the individual and the organization. In 
the structural equation model, these indicator variables identify the latent variables. The eight items on specific types 
of security issues are used to identify the deterrence latent variable. 
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Figure 2 shows the primary results of estimation of the structural equation model. The standardized coefficients are 
displayed for the regression model and for the items on the deterrence variable. To keep the chart readable, the 
coefficients on the other individual factors are not presented. However, all of those are positive and significant at a 1 
percent error level. Cross correlations among those variables are also not shown on this figure. Mean values and 
intercepts were also estimated. Although the majority of these are significant, they are not displayed on this figure. 
The Chi-square goodness of fit measure has an error level of 0.052, which is acceptable (greater than 0.05). The 
root-mean-square-error (RMSEA) is relatively low at 0.043. Other goodness of fit measures are similar, indicating 
that the estimated model is acceptable. 
 
Respondents
Case Exper.
Computer Skill
Computer Laws
Organizations
Case Exper.
Computer Skill
Security
Computer Laws
Investigators
Computer Skill
Security
Case Exper.
Judges
Computer Skill
Case Exper.
Computer Laws
Deterrence
Crackers
Insiders
Virus
ID Theft
SPAM
Spyware
Piracy
Privacy
Juror Exper.
Role
0.033
0.425**
0.035
0.050
0.098
-0.060
R2 = 0.301
0.276*
0.281*
0.313*
0.424**
0.314*
0.962**
0.790**
0.762**
0.878**
0.622**
0.716**
0.759**
0.347**
Exper.
-0.228*
 
Figure 2:  Primary Model Coefficients*. 
 
*The coefficients on the items for the roles (left side) are not shown to save space, but they are all significantly 
positive at a 1 percent error level. The goodness of fit Chi-square probability is acceptable at 0.052. The model has 
an RMSEA of 0.043. 
 
Notice that a few concessions were made from the theoretical model. In particular, the latent variables for the two 
types of attorneys (civil and defense) did not significantly contribute to the model. Although it was possible to 
estimate the variables independently, they tended to destabilize the residuals and since the variables did not have a 
significant effect on the overall model, they were removed. Certain confounding issues arose because the respondent 
and organization variables are measuring similar effects, and the respondent and organization variables are more 
reliable because respondents are reporting on themselves instead of other entities.  
 
In terms of the identification of the basic factors, case experience is the strongest indicator variable. The other 
coefficients are also positive and strong, indicating that the latent variables are accurately identified in terms of 
measuring computer security law knowledge. Higher values of any of the indicators represent higher levels of 
knowledge.  
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 Overall Knowledge by Role  
The easiest way to understand the level of knowledge for the primary roles is to look at the means. Figure 3 shows 
the mean ratings of security knowledge reported for each of the primary roles. The chart shows the differences 
grouped by the respondent’s role, but remember that three of the roles have a limited number of observations. 
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Figure 3:  Mean ratings of security knowledge by role. 
 
The differences might be interesting, but this report focuses on the overall values. The pattern shown here is 
generally representative of the other variables as well. First, note that most of the respondents rated themselves as 
having mediocre or lower knowledge of security (and computers). On the other hand, most reported that someone 
within their organization was considerably more skilled. This level of specialization is rational in larger firms—
particularly given the relative scarcity of computer crime cases compared to other cases. On the other hand, although 
most respondents believed that someone with a relatively high skill exists within their organization, this belief did 
not extend to other organizations. For example, even though prosecutors believe that someone with a relatively high-
level of computer security knowledge exists within their organization, the overall average rating for prosecutors is 
substantially lower than that. The same pattern holds for other categories and roles.  
 
Table 4 presents a view of the overall means, which are useful in evaluating the second set of hypotheses involving 
the valuation of the individual legal system components. Looking across the roles (defense, prosecutor, investigator, 
judge, jury) for each specific category (computer skill, security knowledge, computer law knowledge, and case 
experience), ANOVA results report significant differences. Paired T-tests were used to identify the roles that are 
significantly higher or lower than the others. The first, relatively simple, result is that attorneys always believe 
potential jurors have less knowledge. In terms of knowledge of the law and case experience, this belief is 
undoubtedly true. The results in terms of computer and security knowledge might be true, or this may reflect a 
general belief that attorneys are trained to expect that juries to have minimal knowledge and must be “educated.” On 
the other hand, the similar belief about judges is harder to explain. Although, if it is true, it would imply that any 
educational program will have to include judges specifically. 
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Table 4. Overall Rating Differences*. 
 
Item Significantly Higher Significantly Lower 
Computer Knowledge  Judges, Jurors 
Security Knowledge  Judges, Jurors 
Computer Laws Prosecutors Jurors 
Case Experience Prosecutors Jurors 
*There are significant differences across the roles (Defense, Prosecutor, Investigator, 
Judge, and Juror) for each of the major items. The roles with statistically significant 
(paired T-Tests) results are presented. 
 
A more interesting result is that prosecutors are perceived to have the highest level of computer security law 
knowledge and case experience. Note that federal crime statistics (Federal Justice Resource Center, Administrative 
Office of the U.S. Courts) show about 80 percent of computer crime cases are settled with guilty pleas. 
Consequently, only a handful of these cases go to trial in any year. As a result, defense attorneys are unlikely to 
specialize in the field and rarely see cases. Similarly, it is rare for any given judge to handle a computer crime case. 
On the other hand, prosecutors in large cities could allocate training money to a few classes. Although training funds 
are often limited, with a couple of hundred federal cases a year in the United States, at least a few prosecutors need 
to be trained to handle these cases. This pattern is supported by the prosecutors who responded to the survey—as a 
(small) group, they indicated that they (and other prosecutors) have higher levels of knowledge and experience than 
the other set other legal role players.  
 Deterrence Effect of the Judicial System 
 
Various components of the judicial system can be determined as a deterrence effect by measuring the coefficients of 
the regression model on the deterrence variable. Only two of the coefficients are significantly different from zero, 
but the results are complicated by the correlations across the independent latent variables. The clearest variable is 
the negative coefficient (-0.228) on the independent variable measure job experience. Higher values of the variable 
represent more years on the job. The negative sign means that respondents with more experience believe the judicial 
system is less likely to provide a deterrent to computer crime. This result might be cynicism developed over time, 
idealism of youth, or simply a rational perspective gained through experience.  
 
The other significant effect is more difficult to interpret. The coefficient (0.425) on the organization variable is 
significantly positive at a 1 percent error level. By itself, this states that when respondents perceive a higher level of 
computer security knowledge and experience within their organizations, they believe the judicial system will be a 
stronger deterrent to these types of crimes. The interpretation is slightly complicated by the correlations with the 
other latent variables. Higher levels of organizational value are positively related to higher levels of knowledge with 
the other categories. In other words, higher levels indicate a confidence in the capabilities of the various participants 
within the judicial process which leads to a greater belief that the judicial system can deter crime. From a theoretical 
perspective, this result should be true—since the opposite is undoubtedly true. (If the judicial system has minimal 
skills, dishonest people would eventually take advantage of this perceived lack of knowledge.)  
 
In terms of answering the primary hypothesis regarding effectiveness of the legal system, the key lies in the 
regression coefficients that affect the deterrence variable. Only the coefficient from organizations is significant. In 
particular, respondents do not believe investigators, judges, or jurors can be effective at deterring computer crime. 
Essentially, only a few respondents—specifically from organizations with case experience—believe the legal system 
can serve as a deterrent to computer crime. The means (not shown on the figure) also support the conclusion.  
 
 Deterrence for Specific Security Issues 
 
The deterrence effectiveness of the judicial system can be examined in terms of specific types of crimes. The third 
set of hypotheses regarding the types of crime can be evaluated by examining the magnitude of the standardized 
coefficients on the indicator variables. These values are reported on Figure 2 (on the right-hand side). Notice that all 
of the values are positive and significant at a 1 percent level, which means they are all reasonable indicators. 
However, some of the values are substantially higher or lower than the others. The higher values are associated with 
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crimes that are more likely to be deterred by the judicial system. These types of crimes include external crackers 
(0.962), identity theft (0.878), and insider attacks (0.790). The common feature of these three items is that this 
particular crime types are relatively obvious—they often involve money or damages, have identifiable victims, and 
are relatively easy to explain to jurors. The items with lower values are emphasized by privacy (0.347), spam 
(0.622), and possibly spyware (0.716). These crimes are more difficult to detect, are likely to be committed by 
outsiders (from the organization) who can hide fairly easily, and oftentimes it can be difficult to show victims and 
damages.  
INTERPRETATIONS AND CONCULSIONS 
 
Participants were also given the opportunity to provide written comments. Over half (58%) suggested some type of 
education—particularly for people within the judicial system. A few suggested the need for new laws and better 
enforcement. One directly stated that some of these types of crimes are not being prosecuted because of a lack of 
resources—particularly trained investigators and prosecutors. Based on the level of the overall ratings, along with 
these comments, it is clear that increased education and training is needed. Some work is being done in various 
areas—particularly programs for training investigators to follow defined procedures when collecting evidence. Some 
large organizations provide training for prosecutors—where one or two individuals could specialize in these types of 
cases. But, almost no work is being done in training defense attorneys (or attorneys for civil cases), or judges. 
Additionally, the level of knowledge of computer laws within the potential jury pool is minimal. Based on the 
respondent perceptions, most of the attorneys believe potential jurors have almost no knowledge of any of the 
technical or legal issues associated with computer crimes. This situation will make it difficult to prosecute (or 
defend) these types of cases. Even if a prosecutor has solid evidence, if the case is complex, it will be difficult to 
press the case to a jury trial. From a defendant’s perspective, the situation is even bleaker. Because of the scarcity of 
cases, it will be difficult to find a defense attorney with the technical knowledge and experience to handle the case. 
Cases that have obvious ties to existing laws and procedures will be relatively easy to handle—particularly those 
that involve monetary or physical damages. Cases that hinge on technical issues—particularly privacy, spam, or 
pure data, are going to be considerably more difficult to handle at this time. 
 
Calling for more education is a relatively obvious step. Finding a way to fund it could be more difficult. The 
situation is even more complex for defense (and civil) attorneys. With relatively few cases at the moment, the need 
is not obvious, and it is not clear that the training and education will be profitable. At least in the short run, any 
establishment of educational classes for computer security law will also need to find a way to incorporate defense 
attorneys and judges at a relatively low cost. However, the cost of time is going to be harder to solve. The lack of 
experience in handling cases is an even bigger problem. Understanding the technology and the laws is not enough. 
All participants need practice with the issues to determine which strategies are useful, how best to explain concepts 
to jurors, and to recognize motivations and actions that are the most important.  
 
For the US judicial systems to become more effective at both handling computer crime issues and be a vehicle for a 
deterrent to computer security infractions, this system must be driven by a knowledgeable set of players. This 
implies that attorneys, judges and jury members have a reasonable knowledge base to be conceptually engaged in 
the legal process and follow the issues at a level of understanding so that effective results will be derived. If any part 
of the system is not adequately versed in terminology, concerns or the impact of the pervasive aspects of computer 
security, the system itself is relegated to inaccuracy. This will lead to imbalances that will impact the judicial 
process itself.      
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APPENDIX 
Survey Instrument 
 
Background 
1. Choose the category that best describes your current job/role: 
a. Criminal attorney 
b. Prosecuting attorney 
c. Civil attorney 
d. Judge 
e. Investigator or Law enforcement 
f. Other:     
 
2. Size of the company or organization you work for in total number of all legal cases handled in a year:  
a. 1 – 100  
b. 101 – 500  
c. 500 – 1000  
d. 1001 – 2000 
e. More than 2000 
 
3. Type of city in which you primarily work: 
a. Small, rural community 
b. Mid-size city 
c. Suburb of a larger city 
d. Large metropolitan city 
 
4. Years of experience in your current career: 
a. Less than 1 
b. 1 – 3 
c. 4 – 5  
d. 6 – 10  
e. More than 10 
 
Do you agree or disagree with the following two statements? 
5. Criminal cases regarding computer security and privacy are likely to result in fair/reasonable outcomes. 
a. Strongly disagree  b. Disagree c. Neutral d. Agree e. Strongly agree 
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6. Civil cases regarding computer security and privacy are likely to result in fair/reasonable outcomes. 
a. Strongly disagree  b. Disagree c. Neutral d. Agree e. Strongly agree 
The following questions ask for your opinion of the knowledge and capabilities of several groups of people. 
Evaluate each group based on an average. Enter a number from 1 to 10 in each cell in the grid, with 1 representing 
the lowest level. Be sure to rate yourself as well.  
 
Question Self Your 
organization 
Defense 
Attorneys 
Prosecutors Investigators 
or Police 
Judges Potential Jurors 
Knowledge of 
computers 
       
Knowledge of 
computer security 
       
Knowledge of 
computer security 
and privacy laws 
       
Experience with 
computer security 
and privacy cases 
       
 
Is there someone within your organization who has received specialized training in these areas? (# of people: ____) 
 
For each of these categories, indicate whether you think the legal system will be an effective deterrent to preventing 
problems in that category. Enter a value from 1 to 10, with 1 representing the low end that the legal system will not 
be effective. 
 
Category Effectiveness of legal system 
rating 1 to 10 
Theft or destruction of data by external 
hackers or crackers. 
 
Theft, fraud, or destruction of data by 
insiders (employees/consultants). 
 
Attacks by viruses and worms.  
Identity theft through phishing and similar 
scams. 
 
Unsolicited commercial e-mail (spam).  
Spyware, tracking, and related privacy issues.  
Digital content piracy or theft.  
Customer privacy violations, such as that 
required by HIPAA. 
 
 
The final layout was slightly different since it was administered via a Web site. 
